Battle Report: 10th October 1992 Late Afghan ~vs~ Zulu (Robert
Avery ~vs~ Richard Avery) |
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Report The Zulus formed their traditional “horns of the bull” formation, to which the Afghans replied by grouping their infantry close together in the centre, and placing their cavalry and marksmen on the wings. The battle started well for the Zulus, with the infantry doubling forward rapidly. The two horns quickly disposed of the Afghan marksmen and cavalry: routing them off the field. However, instead of waiting for the horns to encircle the Afghans, the Zulu commander decided to commit the “head” immediately. This turned out to be a serious mistake. Not only were the advancing regiments hit by jezzail and artillery fire, but the ghazi unit of fanatical Afghans repelled two Zulu charges, with the rest of the tribal infantry, held steady by the CinC, repelling another. Next turn, as the Zulu left horn charged the Afghan guns, the Ghazis and one unit of tribesmen followed up on their success: charging the shaken Zulu impi's. Two of these broke immediately, with one literally disintegrating. The left horn’s first element, meanwhile, had been largely destroyed by the guns. Bravely, the second element charged: but the sight of their fleeing comrades meant that they did not press home their attack. With his units either routing or disordered, the Zulu commander ordered a retreat. Casualties The Afghans lost 150 cavalry and 280 tribesmen (mostly from the Ghazis and Marksman units). The Zulus lost 1195 tribesmen: an assegai in the heart of the Zulu nation. Result A
total victory for the Afghans. Analysis Very simply, the Zulu commander should have waited for his ‘horns’ to close in before impetuously committing his centre. Having said that, the Afghan commander did have a run of luck at the points of impact, and it must be said that many people would have committed the same error. The Zulu commander also failed to get his impi's into proper charge distance before impact: often hitting in disorder at the end of a long run up, rather than with a formation still holding its discipline. |